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1Abstract On large networks security administration tasks such as patch man-
agement and event log analysis can take many hours and even days to success-
fully complete even with automated solutions. Currently it is left to the systems
administrators’ discretion to choose in which order to protect individual devices.
In light of the rapidly decreasing time between vulnerabilities being discovered
and maliciously exploited by malware, such an arbitrary method introduces an
unacceptable level of risk to the security of those devices, which are critical to
business processes.
An information risk management approach needs to be adopted to ensure the
protection of the network with a high likelihood; this can be achieved through
the prioritisation of critical devices. In this introductory paper a generic pri-
oritisation technique for individual devices in a network is described oﬀering
a methodical alternative to the current ambiguity of a systems administrators
operations. The technique is based upon compromise path analysis, which iden-
tiﬁes critical paths in a network from a security viewpoint and is relevant in a
wide range of operations from the application of security services to analysing
their results. The vulnerability period metric is introduced, as a mechanism to
control the risk exposure to individual devices through prioritisation.
Key Words: Computer Network Security, Malware, Information Risk Man-
agement, Prioritisation, Compromise Path Analysis & Vulnerability Period.
1 Introduction
In the modern world of always-on (24-7) business needs there is an increasingly
inherent reliance of governments, large corporations and the public at large on
2Information Technology (IT) networks to carry out integral and critical tasks.
The security of such key networks has arisen as a major business and political
issue. As described in [1] the damage caused by attacks on IT networks is very
signiﬁcant: network down time can result in disruption to vital business pro-
cesses; repairing compromised devices can take weeks and consume excessive
amounts of people resource; and loss of reputation can be hard to quantify but
can potentially be the most signiﬁcant cost.
It is argued that if the current trend of reducing time scales in exploitation
and increasing number of software vulnerabilities continues as reported in [2]
then, critical business processes will be exposed to unacceptably high levels of
risk, even in the presence of automated security services such as path man-
agement as advocated in [3]. Therefore the eﬃcient and eﬀective utilisation of
available security resources is required in order to further exploit their potential.
This is highlighted in [4] where it is suggested that many organisations fail to
gain real beneﬁt from their investments in IT systems. Prioritisation of devices
to receive security servicing is an approach, which may be used to enable this,
reducing the time frame within which critical assets may be compromised; we
call this time frame the Vulnerability Period (VP). The VP for each susceptible
device is the time between a vulnerability ﬁrst being reported to the time at
which that device is made secure from such a vulnerability. The V P is deﬁned
as follows,
V P = P · τ + K (1)
where P is the priority (integer value starting from ‘1’, which is the highest
priority) assigned to a given device, τ is the average time taken for a service
3to be successfully performed per device, τ is also variable due to diﬀerences in:
individual services, network latencies and dynamic characteristics of individual
devices; K is the time taken for the developers to provide a solution to ﬁx the
vulnerability from the time of its discovery.
In [1] Brown et al. describe a pro-active malware susceptibility testing tech-
nique (Active Countermeasures), which applies a vaccine (a virus with a NULL
payload) to devices on a network. An automated response is sent back from
the device under investigation indicating its susceptibility to the virus and if
a device is found to be susceptible it is immediately made safe. The scanning
of individual devices is based upon a SETI@home-style [5] setup. Using this
technique networks are separated into clusters of devices with each cluster be-
ing assigned to a given scanner for inspection purposes. However this process
provides the service to devices in an arbitrary sequence. From equation 1 it can
be seen how prioritisation unlike an arbitrary technique can aid the owners of
devices to control the risk exposure to a given device by reducing or increasing
its VP accordingly. Without prioritisation the VP can be any time between one
and n (number of devices under consideration) times the average time (τ) taken
to service a single device.
The use of prioritisation to manage information security risks in IT networks is
endorsed in [6] and [7]. In both of these papers the authors identify the require-
ment for determining the priority and therefore sequence in which individual
devices receive security servicing. The question is how to develop a systematic
technique for achieving such prioritisation? In [8] the authors introduce Op-
erationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) a
high-level strategy designed to identify the relative criticality of information and
4infrastructure assets. Although this methodology provides a valuable context-
driven systematic approach to managing information security risks, it does not
directly address the issue of how one would technically achieve prioritisation and
therefore control the risk exposure through the length of the VP for individual
devices.
The application of security services such as automatic updating of anti-virus
patching and signatures, security event log analysis as well as stateful (deep)
packet analysis are a few examples of where a prioritisation capability could
be employed as part of an overall quality of security service strategy, reducing
the impact of potential compromises. For example in the case of deep packet
analysis, the excessive overheads associated with scanning network communica-
tions as described in [9] means only a subset of the total traﬃc can be scanned.
Therefore a prioritisation technique would prove useful in diﬀerentiating be-
tween network traﬃc for analysis purposes, based upon its potential impact if
it was to compromise the end-point(s).
Security services may also be signiﬁcantly degraded if the infrastructure used to
facilitate them is compromised and brought oﬄine. This is particularly true if
the resources (CPU time and communications bandwidth) of ‘ordinary’ devices
on the network are required to enable such services, which is the case for the
SETI@home-style setup used in the Hewlett Packard (HP) Active Countermea-
sures technique as described previously. It is argued that if a network was to
use a security service(s) based upon such an architecture then the service(s)
would be severely aﬀected if a worm such as Sasser [10] was to attack it, rapidly
limiting available resources. In such a scenario a prioritisation technique would
enable the scarce resources available to be focused at those devices perceived to
5be of greatest business value.
This paper is organised as follows, section 2 describes a simple prioritisation
strategy and highlights its limitations, section 3 details how connectivity in
modern IT networks has evolved and how this has impacted the security risks,
resulting in our investigation into compromise path analysis to quantify such
risks, this is followed by an overview of how networks are modelled in this pa-
per. In section 4 we specify and explain through an example, the algorithm
developed to prioritise the order in which individual devices should receive se-
curity servicing. A brief overview of preliminary results from testing carried out
on a software implementation of the algorithm is provided in section 5, with a
summary and potential future work detailed in section 6.
2 A Simple Prioritisation Strategy
In order to develop any sort of information security risk strategy one must derive
a security criticality classiﬁcation system. This involves the identiﬁcation and
valuation of assets following which prioritisation can be derived, based upon
the risks to those assets. Traditionally a classiﬁcation system consists of a num-
ber of criticality levels, where individual devices are assigned to one such level.
There may be a diﬀerent classiﬁcation system for each of the three principle
security properties of conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability however, for the
purposes of the modelling described in this paper we use only one classiﬁcation
system, which is analogous to that commonly used by many organisations for
information security classiﬁcations. The criticality levels used in this system are
(from high to low criticality): VH, H, M, L and S.
6A simple prioritisation strategy for security purposes would be to order the
application of security services based upon the criticality level to which a device
is assigned, hence all devices with a criticality level of ‘VH’ would be assigned
the highest priority for security service applications. However this may still
result in a relatively arbitrary prioritisation of devices if there are a signiﬁcant
number of devices at the same criticality level in a network. This is illustrated
in equation 2,
Ps =
1
η
(2)
where it can be seen that as the total number of devices at the same criticality
level in a network increases, the probability of any one device (Ps) receiving the
appropriate prioritisation decreases. Therefore the probability of every device
(Pa) receiving servicing in the correct order at any given criticality level can be
deﬁned as,
Pa =
1
η!
(3)
Equation 3 further highlights the limitations of an arbitrary servicing strategy
when considering all devices at the same criticality level.
From equations 2 and 3 it is clear that in order to successfully prioritise, one
requires a diﬀerentiating factor(s) between a set of devices at the same criti-
cality level, otherwise the VP for assets will remain undetermined, where large
numbers of devices are assigned to the same criticality level. One way of achiev-
ing such diﬀerentiation is to identify and analyse dynamic risks to individual
devices and then prioritise the application of security services based upon these
perceived risks. Numerous techniques such as: [11], [12], [13], [14] and [15] exist
7for the identiﬁcation, analysis and ranking (prioritisation) of risks in a network
scenario. However a major limitation with all of these techniques is that they
assume an exhaustive search of the problem space (i.e. identify individual risk(s)
to device(s) and then quantify these based upon the attacker model), which can
be vast and complex in the case of security vulnerabilities in modern IT net-
works.
In order to achieve our goal of pragmatic risk management it was decided to
abstract from speciﬁc instances of threats, instead concentrating on perceived
threats from other devices based upon their criticality level. The classiﬁcation
system used for the purposes of this work assumes that individual devices are
assigned to a criticality level based upon the information and services they host.
In order to reduce security risks to devices with increasing criticality a number
of assumptions have been made for the purposes of this model. Devices of
increasing criticality are said to be:
• Accessed by authorised users in whom one has higher degrees of conﬁdence
• More frequently monitored for abnormalities
• Given higher prioritisation for anti-malware purposes
Based upon the aforementioned assumptions the security risk associated with
devices of increasing criticality are likely to decrease.
3 Evolving Risks in Evolving Networks
One of the major changes in computing networks over the last few years has
been the ability to conveniently form agile business processes through paradigms
based upon wireless ad-hoc communications, service oriented architectures and
8in the longer term grid (or utility) computing. This has resulted in rapid and
complex interconnections between devices previously unimaginable. Such com-
plex interconnections result in open and dynamic connectivity across traditional
networking boundaries not only at a personal or home and small oﬃce level, but
increasingly in the constrained environment of the larger corporate and govern-
ment network, where sensitive information and services must be protected.
The majority of corporate users today utilise computing devices with con-
strained communications capabilities for a limited set of well-deﬁned services,
however in the near future these devices will be used to deliver much more varied
and ﬂexible services using the most functionally and cost eﬀective communica-
tions technique available. This can be seen in the desktop computer which is
no longer only enabled for communications over the wired corporate backbone,
but is increasingly capable of communicating through a multiplicity of inter-
faces such as Infrared and Bluetooth. In addition to the desktop other devices
such as the Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) are also being introduced enabling
ubiquitous capabilities through mobile and heterogeneous† communications.
Another key driver of the complex interconnectivity between devices will be the
enablement of an all Internet Protocol (IP) communications system through
the concept of IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). IMS is being developed by the
telecommunications industry, allowing individual devices such as mobile phones
to directly communicate pushing and pulling content and services to and from
one another in a distributed fashion unlike the principally client-server internet-
working model of the past. An example of how the traditional internetworking
environment is evolving is given in ﬁgures 1 and 2 respectively. From ﬁgure 2 it
†Bluetooth, WiFi, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Universal Mobile Telecommuni-
cations System (UMTS), Ultra Wideband (UWB) and Wireless Broadband (WiMAX).
9can be seen that a much more complex and meshed environment is developing,
where every device has the potential to become a gateway to external networks.
The complexity introduced by such extended connectivity adds to the threat
vector in IT networks.
Although the business beneﬁts of using a more a ﬂexible approach to inter-
networking are clear the complexities introduced pose signiﬁcant technical chal-
lenges, not least from a security point-of-view. One such challenge is to provide
tailored security services according to the diverse needs of individual users and
their devices as described by the Jericho forum [16] and their vision of de-
perimeterised security solutions. De-perimeterisation can already be seen to be
taking place, where distributed or embedded ﬁrewalls are utilised on individual
devices, supplementing the static and skeletal security model of the monolithic
perimeter ﬁrewall solution.
3.1 Network Modelling
Throughout this paper we represent network connectivity as a graph G=hD,Ci.
∀d∈D, where d denotes a physical device and ∀c∈C, where c is an inter device
compromise connection. We use semantic network modelling as described in [7]
to represent compromise network connectivity, where a compromise connection
(c) represents the potential to exploit a ﬂaw(s) by one device in another there-
fore enabling the spread of malware such as viruses and worms. For example if
a device hosts a particular web service application, which is subsequently found
to have a ﬂaw (e.g. buﬀer overﬂow) then all external devices authorised to ac-
cess the application are then considered to have a compromise connection to the
device hosting the vulnerable application. In [7] the author identiﬁes the need
to use either directed or un-directed edges with the added concept of attributes
10to provide further details on particular protocols (e.g. http, https) being run
between devices. In our current model a simpliﬁed version of this is used, where
all links between devices are undirected and attributes are not considered for
simplicity.
A criticism of using such a model driven approach for the description of an
IT architecture, is that the model may quickly become out-of-date particularly
where mobile and ad-hoc devices are used, which have the ability to create and
destroy links dynamically. However there are a number of mature standards
such as the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Common In-
formation Model (CIM) with corresponding tools such as Cheops-ng [17], Nmap
[18] and HPOpenView, which provide semantically rich network topology infor-
mation in real-time. These standards are capable of providing descriptions in a
number of formats, which may be used by techniques such as those described
in this paper for subsequent processing and analysis.
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne, ∀d∈D:
• The criticality level of d, cr to be the security criticality associated with
the device, this attribute is referenced as d · cr
• The compromise path risk level of d, pr to be the risk level of the high-
est threat compromise path associated with the device, this attribute is
referenced as d · pr
• The compromise path length of d, ho to be the length of the compromise
path associated with the device, this attribute is referenced as d · ho
• The residual risk of d, rr to be the residual risk associated with the device,
this attribute is referenced as d · rr
11• The prioritisation status of d, sp to be the priority for receiving security
servicing associated with the device, this attribute is referenced as d · sp
And, ∀c∈C:
• The risk level of c, vb be the connection risk level associated with the
connection, this attribute is referenced as c · vb
• The distinct devices incident to c, es be the two devices associated with
the connection, this attribute is referenced as c · es
From the seven attributes of a device four (cr, pr, ho and rr) are used to identify
the relative risk posed to individual devices in the network G. The technique
proposed in this paper uses at least one and at most all four of these attributes
to prioritise devices. It is assumed that ∀d∈D the administrators of the network
G are able to identify the security criticality level cr based upon a technique
such as Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) infosec security classiﬁcations or
OCTAVE [8]. Devices with a higher criticality level cr have a higher priority,
where cr ∈ {VH, H, M, L, S}.
3.2 Compromise Path Analysis
Although IP networking has the potential to allow ubiquitous connectivity, com-
munications between devices are limited due to routing restrictions imposed by
security services (e.g. embedded ﬁrewalls). This implies that if an attacker
wants to compromise a given device(s) (victim) using a worm for example, then
they must launch an attack from a device(s) which is authorised to connect
to the victim otherwise the attempt to connect will be rejected. We call such
compromise connections compromise paths, where a compromise path consists
of one or a series of compromise connections as described in section 3.1. This
implies that an attacker has to systematically traverse a number of devices and
12overcome various security barriers (defence in depth strategy) such as IP routing
rules, traﬃc analysis and packet inspection to compromise a speciﬁc device in
a speciﬁc manner.
The technique of compromise path analysis as adopted in this work is based upon
that developed by QinetiQ for their Domain Based Security (DBSy) methodol-
ogy [19]. To our knowledge there is no other strategy in the literature similar
to compromise path analysis, which explicitly identiﬁes the threat to a device
based upon the graph theory concept of reachability. We use security critical-
ities to bound the search space, by only analysing for compromise connections
to devices of equal or lower criticality, as they are deemed to pose the main
risk. In the DBSy model, compromise paths are rated according to a technique
analogous to table 1, this is part of a HMG infosec standard [20], for quantifying
risks when connecting devices of diﬀering security criticalities.
Devices with a criticality of ‘S’ are not prioritised at all as they are believed
to be out of the current administrative authorities control, they are only used
as potential attackers in our compromise path analysis technique. Thus the set
of devices in a network G which are prioritised (potential victim devices) is:
DM = {d : D|d · cr 6= ‘S’}. Therefore if for a set of devices, Ds ⊆ DM, one
is unable to prioritise between them based upon security criticality levels (cr)
alone (i.e. they have the same criticality level), then the highest compromise
path risk (pr) associated with such devices may be used to distinguish between
them. Where, ∀d∈Ds, devices with higher compromise path risk levels are given
increased priority.
From table 1 it can be seen that a path between a device of ‘VH’ criticality and
one of ‘L’ criticality has an associated risk level of ‘4’, where a level ‘1’ risk is
13XXXXXXXXX X Victim
Attacker
VH H M L S
VH 1 2 3 4 5
H - 1 2 3 4
M - - 1 2 3
L - - - 1 2
S - - - - 1
Table 1: Risk levels for connected devices.
the lowest level and a level ‘5’ is the highest risk level. It is also illustrated (i.e.
lower half of table is irrelevant) in table 1 that devices are only perceived to be
at risk from those of an equal or lower criticality level.
3.3 Extending Compromise Path Risk Analysis
As well as using compromise path risk levels to distinguish between a set of
devices as is described in the original method in [19], our technique builds upon
this by also using the concepts of compromise path length and residual risk.
Therefore if a set of devices DH ⊆ DM, have the same criticality and compromise
path risk levels, then compromise path length (number of hops between victim
and attacker device) is used to distinguish between them. Where, ∀d∈DH,
devices with lower compromise path lengths are given higher priority. This is
due to the fact that the attacker device (d ∈ D) is closer to the victim device
(d ∈ DH) resulting in less eﬀort to compromise the victim on behalf of the
attacker. We further extend our risk analysis by introducing the concept of
residual risk, therefore if a set of devices, DR ⊆ DM, have the same criticality
level (cr), compromise path risk level (pr) and compromise path length (ho),
then residual risk (rr) is used to distinguish between them. Where, ∀d∈DR,
devices with higher residual risk are given higher priority. The residual risk (rr)
of a device d ∈ DR is calculated as,
14d · rr =
(Σc · vb)2
ζ
(4)
where ζ is the number of directly connected devices which have an equal or
lower criticality level than the device (d), and vb is the connection risk level
for such connections (c ∈ C) and is calculated by comparing the diﬀerence in
criticality levels according to table 1 of the two devices in c · es.
We quantify the risk to a device by assigning the four metrics described previ-
ously to attributes of each potential victim device d ∈ DM in the network G.
The attributes corresponding to each metric and in order of precedence are:
1. cr - Criticality level
2. pr - Compromise path risk level
3. ho - Compromise path length
4. rr - Residual risk factor
Therefore a metric of lower precedence is only used if a higher order metric is
unable to provide prioritisation for a given set of devices.
If for a device d ∈ DM both pr and ho attributes have a value of ‘0’ this
indicates no compromise path exists for d. Otherwise if a compromise path
exists pr takes a value, 1 ≤ pr ≤ 5, where ‘1’ represents the lowest risk and
‘5’ the highest; and ho takes a value, ho > 0. The rr attribute is calculated to
distinguish between devices, which cannot be prioritised using a combination of
cr, pr, and ho attributes, this is speciﬁed in the algorithm in section 4, where
rr ≥ 0.
154 Speciﬁcation of Algorithm
For the purposes of the algorithm to be described, we will deﬁne a number of
terms to aid in its understanding.
Deﬁnition 1: Let DM
(x) ⊆ DM denote the set of devices with a security criti-
cality of x.
Deﬁnition 2: ∀d∈DM, let p(d) calculate the highest risk compromise path of
device d, calculated according to table 1 using a constrained‡ Depth First Search
(DFS). If two or more compromise paths of identical risk level exist for one device
then p(d) chooses the one with the smallest length, choosing any one if more than
one has the same length as well as risk level. Formally p : DM → {1,2,3,4,5}.
Deﬁnition 3: ∀d∈DM, let h(d) calculate the length of the highest risk com-
promise path to d. Formally h : DM → {n : N|n > 0}, where N is the set of
natural numbers.
Deﬁnition 4: ∀d∈DM, let r(d) calculate the residual risk (rr) of the device
d calculated according to equation 4. Formally r : DM → {n : R|n ≥ 0}, where
R is the set of real numbers.
Our consolidated prioritisation technique is recursive and the algorithm is:
1. ∀d∈DM set d · pr = 0, d · ho = 0, d · rr = 0 and d · sp = 0
2. foreach x:=VH:L let DS := DM
(x) ⊆ DM
‡Although beyond the scope of this paper it must be noted that a number of limitations
have been imposed upon the search algorithm to ensure it is computationally feasible, whilst
providing a comprehensive analysis from a security point-of-view.
163. if |DS| > 1 then
4. ∀d∈DS, let d · pr := p(d) and d · ho := h(d)
5. DH := ∅,n := |DS|
6. for t := 1 : n
7. for i := 1 : n
8. if ((dt,di ∈ DS) ∧ (i 6= t) ∧ (dt · pr = di · pr) ∧ (dt,di / ∈ DH)) then
9. DH
0
:= DH ∪ (dt ∧ di)
10. end
11. end
12. end
13. if(DH = ∅) then
14. ∀d∈DS, set priority attribute d·sp giving increased priority to devices
with higher d · pr values
15. end
16. else
17. DR := ∅,Dδ := ∅n := |DH|
18. for t := 1 : n
19. for i := 1 : n
20. if ((dt,di ∈ DH)∧(i 6= t)∧(dt ·ho = di·ho)∧(dt,di / ∈ DR)) then
21. DR
0
:= DR ∪ (dt ∧ di)
22. end
1723. end
24. end
25. if(DR = ∅) then
26. ∀d∈DH, set priority attribute d · sp giving increased priority to
devices (d) with lower d · ho values
27. ∀d / ∈DH∧d ∈ DS, reassign priorities for such devices accordingly
28. end
29. else
30. Dδ := DH \ DR
31. if (Dδ 6= ∅)
32. ∀d∈Dδ, set priority attribute d · sp giving increased priority to
devices (d) with lower d · ho values
33. end
34. ∀d∈DR, set d · rr = r(d)
35. ∀d∈DR, set priority attribute d · sp giving increased priority to
devices (d) with higher d · rr values
36. if ∃d ∈ DR, d · rr attribute values are identical then
37. assign equal priority to such devices
38. end
39. ∀d / ∈DR∧d ∈ DS, reassign priorities accordingly
40. end
1841. end
42. end
43. else if |DS| ≤ 1 then
44. do nothing
45. end
46. end
47. ∀d∈DM reassign priority values for devices according to the cr attribute
values
4.1 Algorithm Execution
In order to illustrate the prioritisation strategy and the individual attribute val-
ues calculated by the algorithm when executed we have analysed the network
given in ﬁgure 2. It is assumed that the ﬁle, mail and web servers are remotely
accessible using the Remote Desktop Protocol by administrator accounts, where
currently those accounts are active on devices ‘A’, ‘E’ and ‘B’ as depicted in
ﬁgure 3. Numerous (i.e. B-D, K-I etc.) other devices are also connected using
this protocol as can be seen from ﬁgure 3. However it is assumed that a ﬂaw
has been identiﬁed in a common application of this protocol, the connectivity
due to this is represented as ‘Compromise 1’ edges in the graph in ﬁgure 3,
where the criticality level associated with a device is given in brackets. Another
ﬂaw allowing a Trojan Horse worm is then assumed to have been discovered
aﬀecting certain versions of both user and server operating systems; this is rep-
resented by the ‘Compromise 2’ connections (edges) in ﬁgure 3. If considered
simultaneously the connectivity due to the aforementioned compromises is as
depicted in ﬁgure 3, this is commonly the case with sophisticated worms which
19utilise numerous ﬂaws or even if one decided to analyse a network for currently
popular vulnerabilities.
The connections between devices B-Mail Server, F-D etc. depicted in ﬁgure
3 illustrate the fact that these devices are using the vulnerable version of the
application running the Remote Desktop Protocol, and more importantly allow
one another to utilise this application (i.e. ﬁrewall on device ‘Mail Server’ is
conﬁgured to allow device ‘B’ to connect and utilise this service). Thus in the
case of an attack if device ‘B’ is compromised it will be able to compromise the
device ‘Mail Server’ even if ‘Mail Server’ has an embedded ﬁrewall enabled.
Table 2 details the values for each attribute of each device after the execu-
tion of the algorithm speciﬁed in section 4, when considering only ‘Compromise
1’. Table 3 gives details when both compromises ‘Compromise 1’ and ‘Compro-
mise 2’ are considered simultaneously.
Device cr pr ho rr sp
File Server VH 5 4 0.0 3
Mail Server VH 5 3 18.0 1
Web Server VH 5 3 4.0 2
A H 1 1 0.0 8
B L 1 1 0.0 13
C H 4 2 12.5 4
D M 3 3 0.0 10
E H 4 2 4.5 5
F H 4 4 0.0 7
G L 2 1 4.0 12
I H 4 2 4.0 6
J L 2 1 4.5 11
K M 3 1 0.0 9
Table 2: Attribute values after execution when considering ‘Compromise 1’.
20Device cr pr ho rr sp
File Server VH 5 4 0.0 3
Mail Server VH 5 3 0.0 2
Web Server VH 5 1 0.0 1
A H 1 1 0.0 8
B L 1 1 0.0 13
C H 4 2 21.3 4
D M 3 3 0.0 10
E H 4 2 4.5 5
F H 4 4 0.0 7
G L 2 1 4.0 12
I H 4 2 4.0 6
J L 2 1 4.5 11
K M 3 1 0.0 9
Table 3: Attribute values after execution when simultaneously considering
‘Compromise 1’ and ‘Compromise 2’.
5 Preliminary Experiment
The algorithm described in section 4 has been developed in a C#.NET soft-
ware version called pfcca. The pfcca software requires an Extensible Markup
Language (XML) ﬁle as input, which adheres to an XML Schema Deﬁnition
describing devices and their associated compromise connectivity. However due
to the time consuming nature of developing such XML input ﬁles by hand it
was decided that automatic compromise connection network topology gener-
ation was required for preliminary testing. We developed a simulator named
generator, which emulates the potential for compromise connections between
devices using a theoretical attack model based upon that of the Blaster [21]
worm and a localised connectivity strategy§ as described in [23]. The details
of the simulator are beyond the scope of this paper, however it is worth noting
that well known power-law strategies [24], [25], [26], [27] for IP network connec-
tivity form the basis of our method, with a subset of this connectivity chosen
to represent the potential for exploitation (compromise connectivity) using our
§Much more likely to infect IP addresses close to its own address, which was a strategy
employed by the Code Red II [22] worm.
21theoretical attack. The generator application randomly assigns a criticality
level to each device in a network, assigning higher criticality levels to critical
nodes such as machines with administrator privileges for servers.
The theoretical attack emulated in the generator software is assumed to aﬀect
the majority of operating systems in use, allowing a remote attacker to gain
unauthorised privileges using an open Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
port to automatically replicate and even compromise the conﬁdentiality and in-
tegrity of information on susceptible systems. It is believed that this is a realisti-
cally achievable attack¶ due to the upsurge in use of Commercial Oﬀ-The-Shelf
(COTS) computing components, which have very similar fundamental struc-
tures and therefore limited defence-in-depth. For example the particular bug
exploited in the Blaster worm aﬀected default installations of Windows NT 4.0,
Windows 2000, Windows XP as well as Windows 2003 Server. Other forms of
malware based upon scripting languages such as Visual Basic (VB) and Java
Server Pages (JSP) take advantage of popular functionality such as Microsoft
Oﬃce and the Java Virtual Machine to propagate and cause a major impact.
This was illustrated with the spread of the Melissa [28] macro virus, which used
VB and various common Microsoft Oﬃce components to infect and spread.
In order to visualise the networks (graphs) produced by the generator soft-
ware a MATLAB M-ﬁle is also created by the simulator, which contains the
adjacency matrix of the graph (G). The gplot function in MATLAB is then
used to draw the network and provide a visualisation of the networks described
in the corresponding XML ﬁle.
¶Even in the presence of distributed ﬁrewalls as the attacker may still be able to attack a
system indirectly through intermediate systems which may have trust relationships.
22To test the eﬀectiveness of our strategy we ran 6 tests over pfcca with each
test consisting of 100 networks (created by generator) of random sizes (rang-
ing from 10 to 1000 nodes) and compromise connectivity. The aim of the test
was to identify what percentage of devices in a network where actually priori-
tised by the four attributes of: criticality (cr), compromise path risk level (pr),
compromise path length (ho) and residual risk (rr). The results are given in
table 4.
Metric Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 Mean S. Dev
cr (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
pr (%) 11.92 12.00 11.53 12.33 11.39 12.64 11.89 0.47
ho (%) 36.39 36.54 36.41 36.29 37.21 36.37 36.79 0.34
rr (%) 50.99 50.87 50.91 50.74 50.48 50.05 50.45 0.35
None (%) 0.70 0.59 1.15 0.64 0.92 0.94 0.87 0.22
Table 4: Comparison of metric performance for prioritisation purposes.
5.1 Experiment Analysis
From the results in table 4 it can be seen that approximately 99.13% of pri-
oritisation decisions for the six tests (600 networks in total) were based upon
one of the four attributes chosen. In comparison 0.87% of decisions could not
be made using any of the four attributes. This highlights the usefulness of
our consolidated prioritisation technique for successfully prioritising devices in
a network. However this does not discount the possibility for further improve-
ments or more eﬃcient ways in which prioritisation could be achieved. The cr
attribute produced no distinguishing results, this conﬁrms our belief that crit-
icality levels alone are not a suitable distinguishing metric for prioritisation in
large networks (or where the number of devices is greater than the number of
criticality levels) as discussed in section 2.
236 Conclusions & Future Work
It is believed that prioritisation of network security services is much needed in
order to successfully protect critical IT assets, particularly as many networks are
allowing more diverse and extended connectivity, which is resulting in increased
security risks. It has been shown that security classiﬁcations alone, do not pro-
vide the required level of granularity upon which to base prioritisation decisions
in large dynamic networks. Therefore we have developed a strategy based upon
compromise path analysis to diﬀerentiate between devices, which are assigned
to the same high-level static criticality level. Our technique considers dynamic
risks from connected devices and quantiﬁes the highest risk posed to any one
device.
There are two cases in which even a prioritisation technique would be of limited
use, ﬁrstly if an attacker has complete knowledge of the prioritisation technique
as well as the criticality levels assigned to individual devices then they may tar-
get speciﬁc devices, to cause maximum impact. Related to this is the fact that an
attacker may employ traﬃc analysis techniques to identify in which order and to
what degree individual devices (or network segments) receive security services,
thus potentially providing valuable information on the criticality of speciﬁc de-
vices (or a group). Secondly it is acknowledged that although our prioritisation
technique may limit the impact from malware such as CodeRed, Blaster and
even Mydoom [29] it would have limited success in protecting against an ex-
tremely sophisticated theoretical attack known as a Flash worm as described in
[23]. A Flash worm is able to accurately pre-compute the network addresses of
susceptible devices, enabling it to spread through the entire Internet in seconds.
24From preliminary testing the dynamic risk analysis technique for prioritisa-
tion described in this paper has delivered promising results, distinguishing be-
tween the vast majority (99.13%) of devices. Initial testing of the technique for
large-scale real-world network topologies has also delivered encouraging results,
however if this is to be done comprehensively then one would need to collate
the necessary network topology semantics information and analysek this using
a tool such as Nmap to identify potential compromise connectivity between de-
vices. The development of an automated technique to achieve this is proposed
as future work. Further work is also required in order to ascertain the eﬀec-
tiveness of the technique for diﬀerent network topologies and criticality systems
with varying levels. It is hoped that the VP can be used as a standard metric
to compare the performance of diﬀering techniques for the reduction of risk to
critical assets in a network.
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kFirewall rules applied by individual devices and network edge ﬁlters at any one time.
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